Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles

School of Law Faculty Scholarship

1991

Evidence
David A. Schlueter
St. Mary's University School of Law, dschlueter@stmarytx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
David A. Schlueter, Evidence 22 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 573 (1991).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

EVIDENCE
by David A. Schlueter*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................
PRESERVATION OF ERROR ..........................................

574
575

A.

III.

IV.

V.

Preserving Error: Motions in Limine and the Need
to Object at Trial.............................................
B. Preserving Error: Offers of Proof.......................
RELEVANCY ISSUES ...................................................
A. In General ......................................................
B. The Ebb and Flow of Relevancy ..................... ....
C. The Rule 403 Balancing Test: Probative Value and
Probative Dangers............................................
D. Evidence of Extrinsic Acts .................................
1. Extrinsic Acts Relevant to the Defendant's Intent or Knowledge ......................................
2. Extrinsic Acts of Third Persons ....................
E. Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Rule
407 ................................................................
WITNESSES .............................................................
A. Competency of Jurors to Testify ........................
B. Control of the Proceedings and Exclusion of Witnesses from the Courtroom ................................
C. Impeachment of Witness with a Prior Conviction..
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TEsmONY .........

..............

580
582
583
585
587
590
590
592
593
596

A.

VI.

Expert Testimony: The "Manifestly Erroneous"
Standard of Review ..........................................
B. A Change in the Approach to Expert Testimony?_
C. The Purpose of Expert Opinion: Assist the Trier of
Fact ...............................................................
D. Cumulative Expert Testimony .............................
HEARSAY ...............................................................
A. Hearsay: Questions Are Not Statements ...............

575
577
578
578
579

596
597
599
601
602
603

*
Professor of Law, St. Mary's University; B.A., Texas A & M University, 1969; J.D.,
Baylor University, 1971; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1981. Reporter, Federal Advisory
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence. The author gratefully acknowledges
the assistance of Ms. Janet Schafer in the preparation of this article.

TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:573

B.

VII.

Statements Not Offered to Prove Truth of the Matter A sserted.....................................................
C. Statements Against Interest Made by an
A ccomplice .....................................................
D. The Business Records Exception .........................
E. Impeaching the Hearsay Declarant.......................
CONCLUSION ...........................................................

I.

604
607
609
610
612

INTRODUCTION

This article addresses some of the more significant "evidence"
cases decided by the Fifth Circuit during the survey period.' Before
turning to the cases themselves, it is important to note at the outset
that like other federal courts, the Fifth Circuit is generally not inclined
to reverse a case on an evidentiary error. It should not be surprising
then that in most of the cases which follow, the court implicitly
deferred to the decision of the trial judge in deciding whether a
certain piece of evidence was admissible. For example, in United
States v. Williams 2 one of the few cases to be reversed on an
evidence point, the court noted that it "reviews a trial court's
determinations regarding relevance of evidence on an 'abuse of
'4
discretion' standard," ' 3 a standard which it considered "rigorous."
Presumably, the court was referring to the fact that the party arguing
that the court erred in admitting evidence carries a considerable
burden in convincing the appellate court that the trial judge erred.
And in Melton v. Deere & Co., 5 the court indicated that the trial
judge's decision to admit or exclude expert opinion evidence will not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is "manifestly erroneous." ' 6 The
standard recognizes that the trial judge must make hundreds of
rulings on evidence during the course of a trial and is often called

1. The survey period ran from June 1, 1989 until May 31, 1990. The article does not
cover those cases where sufficiency of the evidence was the primary issue. Instead, the focus
is on those cases addressing the interpretation and application of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
2. 900 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. May 1990).
3. Id. at 827.
4. Id.
5. 887 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. Oct. 1989).
6. Id. at 1245.
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upon to make "instantaneous" decisions. 7 Even assuming that the
court concludes that the trial court erred, reversal will follow only
if a "substantial right of the party" was adversely affected.'
II.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR

If there is one lesson that must be learned from any study of
the court's evidence cases, it is that in order to have any chance of
success on appeal, counsel must preserve error at the trial level-a
lesson easily recited, but one often forgotten. Federal Rule of Evidence 103 sets out clearly what must be done to preserve error. 9
Absent "plain error," a failure to object at trial will almost always
result in a finding that counsel has waived the issue. 0 If the error
resulted from the admission of evidence, counsel must demonstrate
that a specific, timely objection was made at trial." If the alleged
error resulted from the exclusion of evidence, the counsel must show
that an "offer of proof," or its equivalent, was made at trial.' 2 The
purpose of the latter is to educate the appellate court regarding what,
3
and how important, the rejected evidence was to counsel's case.
A.

Preserving Error: Motions in Limine and the Need to Object
at Trial
Motions in limine are nowhere specifically mentioned in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Nonetheless, they serve as an invaluable
7. See Hardy v. Chemtron Corp., 870 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1989). The Hardy court
also noted that "[a]cknowledging both our respect for the local judge's superior knowledge
of the trial scene and the importance of enabling the trial judge to keep the trial on course,
we accord considerable deference . . . ." Id.
8. See LeBouef v. K-Mart Corp., 888 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. July 1989) (citing FED. R.
Ev. 103(a)).
9. See FED. R. EvaD. 103(a)(1).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Abadie, 879 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. July 1989) (applying the
waiver doctrine to unobjected to hearsay), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 110 S. Ct. 569, 107
L. Ed. 2d 563 (1989). The court noted the availability of the plain error exception but indicated
that it should be "used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of
justice would otherwise result." Id. at 1265 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15
(1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982))). The court in Abadie
indicated that it was "particularly reluctant to brand as plain error, those 'errors that might
have easily been corrected by objection at trial."' Id. at 1265 (quoting United States v. Brown,
548 F.2d 1194, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1977)).
11. See FED. R. EvyD. 103(a)(1).
12. See FED. R. Eva,. 103(a)(2).
13. See generally McCoRmcK ON EVIDENCE § 51, at 123-24 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)
(noting that the primary reason for an offer of proof is to educate the appellate court -and
that the secondary reason is to permit the judge further opportunity to reconsider the issue).
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method of challenging the admissibility of evidence, usually before
trial begins. Despite the utility of obtaining a favorable pretrial ruling,
it may still be necessary for counsel to object again at trial if the
opponent disregards the court's in limine ruling not to introduce
certain evidence.
For example, in United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v.
Olympia Wings, Inc. , 4 one of the defendants obtained an in limine
ruling from the court barring the mention of "any offer of settlement,
compromise or offer of payment" until it had been brought to the
attention of the court so it could render a ruling on the admissibility
of the evidence. 5 At trial, one of the plaintiffs obtained permission
from the court to mention a settlement in an attempt to rehabilitate
one of its witnesses.' 6 Later, however, the same party introduced
similar evidence during the examination of other witnesses without
seeking permission. 7 There was no objection to the latter use-one
which apparently was a clear violation of the court's in limine ruling. 8
On appeal, the court rejected the argument that error was nonetheless
preserved with regard to this latter use of settlement evidence because
it was offered in violation of the pretrial ruling. 9 The court stated:
[O]bjection is required to preserve error when an opponent, or
the court itself, violates a motion in limine that was granted. This
rule is necessary to conserve judicial resources. Had . . . counsel
promptly objected to the violations of the motion in limine in
this case, the trial court could have either avoided the violations
or given an instruction to cure any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.
The courts cannot adopt a rule that would permit counsel to sit
silently when an error is committed at trial with the hope that
they will get a new trial because of that error if they lose."2
This rule makes sense, although at first blush it may give the
impression that there is really nothing to gain from obtaining favorable in limine rulings. In this case, the trial court apparently deferred
a final ruling on the admissibility of the challenged evidence until it
could see the context in which it might be offered. Thus, both sides

14.
15.

896 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. Mar. 1990).
Id. at 955.

16.
17.

See id.
See id.

18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 956.
Id. (quoting Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 785-86 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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should have been alerted to the need to renew the objection, or
obtain permission, when the evidence in question was ultimately
offered. As the court noted, "[I]t is too great a handicap to bind a
trial judge to a ruling on a subtle evidentiary question ... outside
' 21
a precise factual context."
B.

Preserving Error: Offers of Proof

In briefly addressing the role of the offer of proof in preserving
2 3 considered
error," the court in McPheron v. Searle Laboratories
the issue of whether an intrauterine device manufactured by Searle
should be treated as a prescription drug under Louisiana law.2 At
trial, the court ruled that it was a prescription drug, thus blocking
any attempts by the appellant to introduce evidence of design defects
in the device. 25 On appeal, the appellant challenged the ruling and,
in response, the appellee argued that the issue was not reviewable
because the appellant had not provided the court with a transcript
of her offer of proof spelling out the sum and substance of the
excluded evidence. 26 The court responded that even assuming the trial
court's ruling was evidentiary, rule 103(a)(2) permits review where
the "substance of the evidence was made known to the court by
offer or was apparent from the context within which the questions
were asked." ' 27 Here, said the court, the transcript of the trial judge's
ruling and the remainder of the record apprised it of the substance
of the excluded evidence.2 This view, which generally comports with
earlier cases from the court, should not be read as a signal that
offers of proof, or their equivalent, are not necessary. Instead, it

21. Id. (quoting United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 104 (1st Cir. 1987)).
22. See FED. R. Evm. 103(a)(2).
23. 888 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. Nov. 1989), question certified, 559 So. 2d 130 (La. 1990),
certified question withdrawn, opinion vacated, 904 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. June 1990). See infra
note 24.
24. Id. The Fifth Circuit ultimately certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court the question
of whether an intrauterine device is a prescription drug. See id. at 35. However, the certified
question was subsequently withdrawn by the Fifth Circuit, and the opinion accompanying the
certified question was vacated. McPheron v. Searle Labs., 904 F.2d 251, 251 (5th Cir. June
1990). Although the opinion was vacated, the case remains instructive regarding the review of
offers of proof.
25. 888 F.2d at 32.
26. Id. at 32 n.4.
27. Id. (quoting FED. R. Evm. 103(a)(2)).
28.

Id.
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only signals that the court will review the record to determine if in
fact the "excluded" evidence is referenced within the record with
sufficient clarity to permit an informed decision about whether the
trial judge erred in its exclusion.

III.

RELEVANCY IssuEs

A.

In General

The minimum threshold for any offered item of evidence is that
it is relevant. In the words of Federal Rule of Evidence 401, that
means that the evidence has: "any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-

dence. "29
What is relevant will depend largely on the applicable substantive
law, the pleadings and the ebb and flow of the trial. That is, what
may not have been relevant on the first day of trial later becomes
relevant because of other evidence that has been admitted. The
requirement reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 401 is in effect a
requirement that the offered evidence be "logically relevant.'' 30 Even
assuming that the offered evidence is relevant within the meaning of
rule 401, it may be excluded for a variety of policy reasons expressed
in the other rules of evidence.
The concept of excluding otherwise logically relevant evidence is
best reflected in rule 403, 3' discussed later 2 which authorizes the trial
court to balance the probative value of the offered, and presumably
logically relevant evidence against the probative dangers of admitting
it.13 But the authority of the court to exclude otherwise logically
relevant evidence is also specifically recognized in other rules of
evidence within Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence. For
example, rule 404 generally excludes character evidence except in

29. FED. R. Evm. 401.
30. See generally McCoRmcK oN EVIDECE § 185, at 542 (K. Broun 3d ed. 1984) (defining
evidence with probative value to have "logical relevance" and evidence lacking in probative
value to be "remote").
31. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
32. See infra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
33. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
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certain well-defined circumstances.34 Also, evidence of subsequent
remedial measures" and evidence of settlement offers3 6 are normally
inadmissible, even though the evidence would tend to prove or
disprove a fact in issue in the case.
B.

The Ebb and Flow of Relevancy

Federal Rule of Evidence 401, 7 requires that offered evidence
tend to prove or disprove an issue in the case.3 8 At the beginning of
the trial, before any evidence is offered, the question of relevancy is
normally governed by the applicable substantive law and the pleadings. However, during trial one side or the other may open the
proverbial door to an issue and thereby provide opposing counsel
with an opportunity to respond with evidence which might not
otherwise have been relevant. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence
106 specifically provides that "fairness" may require the introduction
of the remaining portions of a writing of which only a portion has
been admitted or other writings or recorded statements which relate
39
to the offered writing.

In LeBoeuf v. K-Mart,40 a slip and fall case, the plaintiff
attempted to introduce evidence of the subsequent condition of the
floor at the defendant's store . 4 The trial court sustained the defendant's objection on the ground that there appeared to be no probative
value to the evidence.42 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the
evidence was admissible because the defendant had opened the door
during cross-examination of the plaintiff's expert witness.4 3 The court

rejected the argument." The plaintiff's expert had offered opinion
testimony about the inspection and maintenance conditions in the
defendant's store and on cross-examination the defendant, in an
attempt to challenge the basis of that opinion testimony, had asked

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See FED. R. Evm. 404.
See FED. R. Evm. 407.
See FED. R. Evm. 408.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
See FED. R. EvD. 401.
See FED. R. Evm. 106.
888 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. July 1989).
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the witness if he had ever visited the store.4 That questioning, said
the court, did not open the door to admission of otherwise irrelevant
46
evidence of subsequent conditions at the store.
C.

The Rule 403 Balancing Test: Probative Value and Probative
Dangers

As noted previously,4 7 Federal Rule of Evidence 403" permits
the trial court to exclude otherwise logically relevant evidence if, on
balance, the probative dangers 9 substantially outweigh the probative
value." During the survey period, the court specifically recognized
rule 403 as a ground for excluding logically relevant evidence in a
number of cases. 5 1 For example, in Leefe v. Air Logistics, 2 the court
concluded that expert testimony offered by the plaintiff would have
been cumulative and therefore the trial court did not err in excluding
it." In LeBoeuf v. K-Mart,5 ' the court concluded that the trial judge
correctly excluded evidence of a subsequent condition in the defendant's store where the probative value of the offered evidence was
"quite low" and its admission might have mislead the jury.5
Perhaps the best recent example of the court's approach to rule
403 is found in Herrington v. Hiller.3 6 In Herrington, a medical
malpractice action, the plaintiffs attempted to offer evidence that the
hospital's failure to provide 24-hour anesthesia services was below

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
48. FED. R. Evw. 403.
49. Rule 403 cites the following as reasons for excluding evidence: unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues, misleading the jury, considerations of undue delay, waste of time or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. The first three relate to intrinsic policy values
associated with concerns about the jury, while the last three focus on intrinsic concerns about
judicial economy.
50. Note that rule 403 is a rule of exclusion, not admission. Thus, evidence which is not
otherwise logically relevant does not gain acceptability simply because the probative dangers
of admitting it are low.
51. See, e.g., Williams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. June 1989)
(employing rule 403 to exclude evidence of a settlement agreement and evidence of the plaintiff's
arrest record).
52. 876 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. June 1989).
53.

Id. at 411.

54.
55.

888 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. July 1989).
Id. at 333.

56.

883 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. Sept. 1989).
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the requisite standard of care. 7 The evidence consisted of testimony
and documents indicating attempts by individuals to obtain the service
and the eventual implementation of such measures by a third-party
care provider. 8 Citing rule 403, the trial court excluded the evidence
59
of remedial measures:
While the evidence might have some small relevance, some small
amount [of] probative value on the issue of the alleged negligence
of the defendant in failing to adhere to the proper standard of
care, the Court is of the opinion that it would tend to confuse
the jury by diverting its attention from the standard of care at
the time of the operation performed in this case, and for that
reason it should be excluded.6
Noting that this was "atypical and a close case, ' 61 the Fifth Circuit
indicated that in reviewing rule 403 rulings it would reverse only for an
abuse of discretion.6 It also noted, however, that it has cautioned trial
courts against "overuse of rule 403 as an exclusionary device" and
that the rule provides an "extraordinary remedy that must be used
sparingly." 64 After closely examining the evidence, the court concluded
that the probative value of the excluded evidence was "vital" to the
issues in the case 6" and rejected the trial court's reasoning that the
evidence would have been confusing to the jury. 6 The judgment of the
trial court was vacated and remanded for a new trial.67
The court's decision in Herrington is important for several
reasons. First, it serves as a reminder that rule 403 is not to be
applied lightly or too quickly. The language of the rule itself suggests
that relevant evidence is presumed to be admissible; only if the
probative dangers "substantially outweigh" the probative value may
the evidence be excluded." Thus, the burden rests upon the opponent
to justify exclusion of the evidence. Second, reversals on rule 403

57.

Id.at 412.

58.

Id. at 412-13.

59. Id. at 413. The portion of the opinion dealing with the possible application of rule
407 is discussed infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
60. 883 F.2d at 414.
61. Id.at 412.
62. Id.at 414.
63.

Id.

64.

Id. (quoting Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985)).

65.

Id.

66.
67.

Id.at 414-15.
Id.at 416.

68.

See FED. R. Evm. 403.
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rulings are possible although appellate courts typically accord great
deference to the evidentiary rulings of trial judges, especially with
regard to rule 403 issues.
D.

Evidence of Extrinsic Acts

One of the most controversial and litigated rules is Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b).6 9 As a general principle, the prosecution is not
permitted to introduce evidence of a defendant's character or propensity to commit a crime. 70 Rule 404(b), however, permits introduction of other crimes or acts7 ' committed by the defendant if they
are relevant to an issue other than to show that the defendant has a
bad character. In most cases, the prosecution will be able to find
some way to use a defendant's uncharged misconduct during the
trial. Although defense counsel may attempt to limit mention of this
type of evidence at trial through a favorable ruling on a motion in
limine, many judges will wait until the evidence is offered during the
trial in order to more closely gauge the relevancy of the defendant's
acts to the case. Also, while the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence have proposed an amendment to rule 404(b) which would require notice of an intent to use
the evidence,72 there are still the inevitable surprises at trial.
The leading Fifth Circuit case on the admissibility of a defendant's extraneous offenses, or extrinsic acts, is United States v.
Beechum.71 In Beechum, the court set out a two-pronged requirement:
First, the offered extraneous offense must be relevant to an issue
other than the defendant's character, and second, the probative value

69. See FED. R. Evm. 404(b) which states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
70. See MCCORMCK ON EvrDENcE § 190, at 557 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
71. Most of the cases addressing the rule focus on extraneous "offenses" of a defendant
but the rule is broader and covers acts which may not necessarily amount to criminal activity.
72. The following language would be added at the end of the existing rules: "[P]rovided
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial." FED. R.
Evm. 404(b) (Proposed Amendment), reprinted in 110 S. Ct. 804.
73. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
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of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.74 The trial court's decision admitting Rule 404(b) evidence will
be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Before turning to the cases addressing Rule 404(b), it is important
to note that the rule does not apply to acts or crimes which are
7
"intrinsic" to the charged offense. In United States v. Williams,
the court carefully noted the distinction. Other act evidence, according to the court, is intrinsic when the evidence of the other act and
evidence of the crime charges are '"inextricably intertwined' or both
acts are part of a 'single criminal episode,' or the other acts were
'necessary preliminaries' to the crime charged.' '76
The court in Williams determined that the offenses were not
extraneous and were not governed by rule 404(b).7 7 Evidence of
intrinsic acts, however, would still be subject to the requirement of
relevancy and the balancing test of rule 403 .78 Where the offered
evidence is extrinsic or extraneous, it may nonetheless be admissible
if the evidence is probative of one of the nine reasons listed in rule
404(b) 79 or a similar reason. During the survey period, the court had
several opportunities to review a trial court's decision to admit rule
404(b) evidence.
1. Extrinsic Acts Relevant to the Defendant's Intent or
Knowledge
Rule 404(b) indicates that extrinsic act evidence is admissible on
the issue of the defendant's intent or knowledge. Use of rule 404(b)

74. Id. at 911.
75. 900 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. May 1990).
76. Id. at 825.
77. See id.For example, in United States v. Price, 877 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. June 1989),
the court concluded that evidence of conversations between the defendant and an informant
concerning the uncharged act of manufacturing firearms was not an extraneous offense because
it was only relevant in the "context" of the conversation in which the purchase of firearms
also was discussed. Id. at 337.
Sometimes the terms, "context of the offense," "background evidence" and "res gestae"
will be used by courts instead of the term "intrinsic." The term "res gestae" is particularly
troublesome because courts sometimes make indiscriminate use of the term in evidentiary
contexts not related to rule 404(b). For an extensive discussion of the admissibility of res
gestae evidence in Texas courts, see Gaines v. State, 789 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990, n.w.h.). See generally Schlueter, The Elusive Res Gestae, 53 Tax. B.J., 641 (1990).
78. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
79. See supra note 69.
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for the purpose of illuminating a defendant's intent or knowledge
was the focus in a number of opinions during the survey period.
In United States v. Williams,8° the defendant was charged in
part with using the mails to facilitate drug trafficking. The trial court
granted the defense motion to exclude evidence that the defendant
was linked with nineteen prior mailings under similar conditions from
Los Angeles to New Orleans. 8' On a government appeal of the ruling,
the Fifth Circuit reversed. Applying the two-step Beechum test 8 2 for
admitting evidence of extrinsic acts, the court concluded, first, that
the other acts of mailing 3 were relevant to the issue of the defendant's
intent and knowledge that the package that he had received in the
mail contained cocaine.8 Applying the rule 403 balancing test-the
second prong of the Beechum formula-the court noted that the
potential probative value of the evidence was great; without it, the
government would be limited to showing that a package containing
cocaine was delivered to an address when the defendant was not
there and was accepted by another person.8 5 On the other hand, the
court reasoned that as long as the jury is instructed about the limited
admissibility of the "other act" evidence, there would be little danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury."
In United States v. Moree,87 the defendant was charged with
various obstruction of justice charges. The court concluded that the
prosecution's evidence that the defendant had offered to "fix" the
criminal trial of another public official was admissible.sa The evi-

80. 900 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. May 1990).
81. Id. at 824.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
83. Apparently not all of the other acts of mailing items from Los Angeles to New
Orleans were necessarily illegal and the court noted that the "other act" need not be wrongful.
900 F.2d at 826 n.2.
84. Id. at 826. The court noted that before the evidence may be admitted the trial court
must determine, under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), whether the jury could find by a
preponderance of the evidence whether in fact the alleged extrinsic acts actually occurred. Id.
at 825; see also United States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. Aug. 1989) (holding that
evidence of drug use during the existence of a conspiracy was admissible to show the defendant's
knowledge and intent or motive), cert. denied, - U.S.
-,
110 S. Ct. 1152, 107 L. Ed.
2d 1056 (1990).
85. 900 F.2d at 827.
86. Id.; see also FED. R. Evm. 105 (evidence admissible for limited purposes).
87. 897 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. May 1990).
88. See id. at 1334-35.
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dence, in the court's view, was relevant under rule 404(b) to the issue
of the defendant's intent on the charged offense.8 9
The defendant in United States v. Knight,90 was charged with
making and filing false tax returns. Evidence that he had previously
paid his gambling debts through his wholly owned corporation was
relevant to the defendant's intent and absence of mistake. 91 In United
States v. Stephenson,92 the defendant was charged with manufacturing
illegal substances. The court held that evidence of the defendant's
previous acts of manufacturing and distributing illegal substances
was relevant under rule 404(b) to the issue of the defendant's intent. 9
2.

Extrinsic Acts of Third Persons

Rule 404(b) is not limited to prosecutorial use of a defendant's
extrinsic acts, although for all practical purposes that is the most
common use. In two cases, the Fifth Circuit addressed the availability
of rule 404(b) evidence to the defendant.
In United States v. Reeves,94 the defendants were charged with
extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion. The charges arose out
of payments made to them in their capacities as Commissioners of
the Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District in return for their
helpful votes on the awarding of stevedoring contracts.91 A contractor
provided recorded conversations of his dealings with the defendant9
and served as a government witness at trial.9 Citing rule 404(b), the
defendants attempted to introduce evidence that the contractor had

89. Id. at 1335. The court determined that the defendant's intent was placed in issue in
the trial when he pleaded not guilty. Id. The court noted that it had stated on prior occasions
that in every conspiracy case, "a not guilty plea renders the defendant's intent a material
issue." Id. The court also noted that the intent in both the charged offense and extraneous
offense must be the same. Id.
90. 898 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. Mar. 1990).
91. Id. at 439; see also United States v. York, 888 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. Nov. 1989) (holding
that the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant had received a
check for over one million dollars from an associate where the evidence was relevant to his
knowledge regarding unlawful real estate transactions).
92. 887 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. Oct. 1989), cert. denied, U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. 1151, 107
L. Ed. 2d 1054 (1990).
93. Id. at 60. The court noted that the relevancy of the extraneous acts was "accentuated
by the defendant's pleas of entrapment." Id.
94. 892 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. Jan. 1990).
95. Id. at 1224.
96. Id.
97. Id.at 1225.
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communicated with two other public officials in an attempt to receive
favorable treatment; the first related to a communication by the
contractor to a state representative who was to intercede with the
defendants on the contractor's behalf 8 and the second was a communication by the contractor to another Dock Board commissioner."
The defendants argued that the evidence not only would be relevant
to their claim of entrapment but also to show that the contractor
had a "plan" to bribe public officials.'00
The court rejected the defendant's arguments.' 0 ' "The entrapment defense," said the court, "focuses on the intent . . . of the
defendant," not the intent of the government agent.' 2 The court
also rejected the argument that its prior decision in United States v.
McClure'0 3 was controlling.l'4 In McClure, the defense was permitted
to introduce, under rule 404(b), evidence that the government informant had a history of violence against other persons. 05 The
defendant, knowing of the informant's violent history, had agreed
to engage in the criminal activity because he believed the informant's
threats on his life.'°0 The court noted that in McClure it had permitted
evidence of those extrinsic acts which demonstrated a "systematic
campaign of threats and intimidation against other persons ... to
show lack of criminal intent by a defendant who claims to have been
illegally coerced."' 7 In Reeves, one of the alleged extrinsic acts of
contacting a public official took place five years earlier when the
contractor was not working for the government; the second incident
arose from the transaction forming the basis of the charges in the
case.108 The contractor's two acts did not demonstrate the type of
campaign of threats and intimidation envisioned in McClure.1'9
One of the defendants in United States v. Long" ° attempted to
offer extrinsic act evidence of his codefendant."' The defendants had
98.

Id.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
546 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1977).
United States v. Reeves, 892 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. Jan. 1990).
546 F.2d at 672-73.

106. Id. at 672.
107. 892 F.2d at 1225.

108. Id.
109.
110.

Id.
894 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. Jan. 1990).

111. Id. at 103.
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engaged in a fraudulent oil deal with a third party who ultimately
pleaded guilty and testified against the defendants." 2 In a motion in
limine, one of the defendants, Long, sought a ruling on whether he
could introduce rule 404(b) evidence that the other defendant, Clothier, had been involved in lawsuits involving similar irregular transactions.' 13 The trial judge excluded the evidence "on the ground that
4
it created a risk of prejudice to [defendant] Clothier.""1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the trial court had
correctly excluded the offered evidence." 5 Although defendant Long
had argued on appeal that the rule 404(b) evidence was admissible
to show his "motive" in agreeing to enter into a transaction with
defendant Clothier, the court concluded that he had really attempted
to offer the evidence to prove the opposite point-that he was not
16
aware of Clothier's past and was tricked into the fraudulent deal.
The fact that the court in both Long and Reeves ultimately
rejected the defendants' offers of rule 404(b) evidence involving third
persons does not signal that such evidence is not admissible. Instead,
the two cases appear to be fact-specific. In a different setting, the
evidence may indeed be relevant and outweigh the prejudicial dangers
it poses. The decisions also demonstrate the importance of carefully
spelling out for the trial court why the Rule 404(b) evidence is
logically relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character.
The lesson, of course, applies to whichever side is offering the
evidence.
E. Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Rule 407
Another example of excluding otherwise logically relevant evidence is expressed in Federal Rule of Evidence 407 which usually
prohibits the introduction of evidence of "subsequent remedial measures" in order to show "negligence or culpable conduct." 11 7 The
logical relevance of a subsequent repair is that it may amount to an

111.

Id. at 103.

112.
113.

Id.
Id.

114.
115.
116.
on the
it was
117.

Id. at 104.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 105. It appeared to the court that Long would have offered the 404(b) evidence
issue of Clothier's "character." Id. If indeed that was the real purpose of the evidence,
probably inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EvD.404(a).
See FED. R. Evm. 407.
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admission of fault by the responsible party." 8 Rule 407 recognizes,
however, that despite the possible probative value of the evidence, it
is better to encourage manufacturers and employers to remedy defects
or deficiencies in products, conditions or policies." 9 The rule is not
absolute and evidence of subsequent remedial measures may be
admissible to show ownership or control or for purposes of impeachment.120
Rule 407 was addressed in Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,121
where the plaintiffs in a products liability action alleged that the
defendant's negligent design of an airplane's control assembly had
caused a crash resulting in the deaths of two individuals. 122 At trial,
the plaintiffs attempted to introduce a 1983 shop manual regarding
another aircraft manufactured by the defendant; the manual gave a
more detailed explanation about the installation of the components
in question than did the manual pertaining to the aircraft which
actually crashed in July, 1983.123 The trial court excluded the evidence
under rule 407.12A On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that rule 407 only
applies to remedial measures made in response to the accident in
question.'2 Noting that, as in most of the cases addressing rule 407,
it was not clear in the case why changes were made in the shop
manual, the court said the focus should not be on the reasons for
subsequent remedial measures. 126 Instead, in applying rule 407, courts
should
consider the probative value of such evidence on the point at
issue. The real question is whether the product or design was
defective at the time the product was sold. The jury's attention

118. See FED. R. Evm. 407 advisory committee's note.
119. The Fifth Circuit has held, however, that rule 407 does not apply to subsequent
remedial measures taken by a third party. See, e.g., Herrington v. Hiler, 883 F.2d 411, 41314 n.9 (5th Cir. Sept. 1989) (citing Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d
700, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 583 (5th Cir.
1985)).
120. See FED. R. Evro. 407.
121. 886 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. Oct. 1989).
122. Id. at 760.
123. Id. at 763. The aircraft that crashed was manufactured in 1961. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.; see generally Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1980) (remedial
measures were admissible because they were made in response to new federal regulations and
therefore could not have been construed as an admission of a defective design), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 928 (1981).
126. 886 F.2d at 763.
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should be directed to whether the product was reasonably safe at
the time it was manufactured .... The introduction of evidence
about subsequent changes in the product or its design threatens
to confuse the jury by diverting its attention from whether the
product was defective at the relevant time to what was done later.
Interpreted to require the evidence to focus on the time when the
product was sold, Rule 407 would conform to the policy expressed
in Rule 403, the exclusion of relevant information if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion.'"
The court ultimately concluded that the 1983 shop manual was
properly excluded under rule 407 because it could have been viewed
by the jury as an admission by the defendant that its control
instructions were defective.'2
Timing of a remedial measure was at issue in Roberts v. Harnischfeger Corp.'s The plaintiff was injured In February, 1984 when
a 250-pound block (pulley) on a crane manufactured by the defendant
became loose and fell on him. 30 He brought suit against the defendant
on theories of strict liability, common law negligence, breach of
implied warranties and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.' 3 ' The accident apparently resulted from "two-blocking,"
a condition which arises when the block comes into contact with the
tip of a crane's boom.'32 When the crane was manufactured in 1978,
the defendant had offered an anti-two-blocking device as an option.'3 3
At trial, the plaintiffs offered evidence that in January 1984, one
month before the accident, the defendant had changed its policy and
was putting the protective devices on all of its cranes as standard
equipment."' Relying upon rules 402 and 403, the trial court ruled
that the evidence was inadmissible.'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling,
noting that whether the company had taken corrective action before
the accident was not relevant to the case. 36 In a lengthy footnote,

127. Id. (quoting Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th
Cir. 1983)).
128. Id.
129. 901 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. Sept. 1989).
130. Id. at 43.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 44.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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however, the court added that rule 407 was not applicable. 3 7 Rule
407 only permits exclusion of subsequent remedial measures when
precautionary steps are taken after the event. 38 The key "event" in
the case, said the court, was the accident in February, 1984. 39Thus,
any corrective actions taken in January, 1984 would not have been
excluded under rule 407.'4
IV.

WITNEssEs

All witnesses are presumed to be competent to testify under
Federal Rule of Evidence 601, although the rule recognizes that under
the applicable state law a witness may be determined incompetent. 14 ,
For example, in a federal diversity action involving a dispute over
an estate, a state's Dead Man's statute may apply.' 42 Article VI of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which generally focuses on "witnesses," also specifically addresses the incompetency of certain persons to testify'43 and methods of impeaching a witness who is
testifying.'4 During the survey period, the court addressed both
issues.
A.

Competency of Jurors to Testify

Federal Rule of Evidence 606 states that a juror may not testify
in a trial in which the juror is sitting. 45 The juror is also proscribed
from testifying in an inquiry into the validity of a verdict about
statements made during deliberations or "to the effect of anything
upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the
juror . . . ."I" The oft-stated purpose of this last proscription is the
desire to protect the "freedom of deliberation, stability and finality

137. Id. at 44 n.l.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. FED. R. EvWD. 601.
142. See FED. R. EvD. 601 Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 93650 (rejecting Advisory Committee's draft of rule 601 which would have barred use of Dead
Man's Statutes).
143. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 605 ("Competency of Judge as Witness").
144. See, e.g., FED. R. Evn. 607 ("Who May Impeach"); FED. R. EviD. 613 ("Prior
Statements of Witnesses").
145. FED. R. Evrn. 606(a).
146. FED. R. Evi. 606(b).
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of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment.' ' 47 Yet, the proscription is not absolute and rule 606(b)
permits a juror to testify about "whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror."''

4

The question of the competence of a juror to testify under rule
606(b) was addressed in Weaver v. Puckett,'49 a habeas corpus action.
The petitioner, who had been convicted of arson in a Mississippi
state court, argued that he was entitled to a hearing on the issue of
whether his sixth amendment right to a competent jury was violated
because a juror was hearing-impaired."10 Noting that rule 606(b)
reflects the common law rule generally prohibiting inquiry into jury
deliberations, the court recognized that like rule 606(b), the common
law permitted inquiry when it was alleged that an extraneous influence
had allegedly affected the jury."' However, inquiries into the physical
or mental competence of a juror were considered under the common
law to be matters of an internal, rather than an external nature and
2
as a general rule could not be the basis for an inquiry."
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Tanner v. United States,"'
the court observed that the common law had recognized another
exception to the rule barring postverdict inquiries where "substantial
if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency" had been introduced." 4 The Supreme Court in Tanner, however, did not decide
whether the exception survived the adoption of rule 606(b).1' Even
assuming that it did, the common law exception required production
of evidence on the issue from a nonjuror." 6 In Weaver, the only
evidence presented from someone other than the juror herself, were

147. See FED. R. Evm. 606(b) advisory committee's note (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238
U.S. 264 (1915)).
148. See FED. R. EvnD. 606(b).
149. 896 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. Mar. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S., 111 S. Ct. 427, 112
L. Ed. 2d 411 (1990).
150. Id. at 127.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 128.
153. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
154. 896 F.2d at 128 (quoting 483 U.S. at 125 (quoting United States v. Droguardi, 492
F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974))).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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"conflicting and essentially off-setting" affidavits from two audiologists which were in turn based upon a review of the juror's testimony. 57 Thus, the trial court correctly declined to order a hearing
on the issue. 58
The Weaver decision is potentially important in that it recognizes
that the Fifth Circuit might be sympathetic to arguments that a juror
was clearly "incompetent" and should not have served. 59 The key
to successfully raising the common law exception is the ability to
make what the court called an "extremely strong showing" of juror
6
incompetence without relying upon the testimony of the juror.1 0
B.

Control of the Proceedings and Exclusion of Witnesses from
the Courtroom

It is axiomatic that trial judges have a great deal of freedom in
conducting trials and hearings, as long as they do not abuse their
discretion. Federal Rule of Evidence 611 specifically provides: "(a)
Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over
the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence
so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time,
and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. '"161 A related issue is the authority of trial judges to exclude
certain witnesses from the courtroom. 62
Both issues were raised by the defendant in United States v.
Samples. 6 3 Following his conviction on a charge of interstate transportation of a stolen aircraft, Samples filed a pro se motion under
28 U.S.C. section 2255 to vacate his sentence.'" The Fifth Circuit

157. Id.
158. See id. at 127.
159. See id. at 127-28; see also Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
due process required a hearing on the issue of whether the juror was incompetent because the
juror had told the prosecutor that he had been harassed by voices and vibrations during the
trial).
160. 896 F.2d at 127. It is not clear from Weaver whether the court would be inclined to
apply the exception where there was evidence that a juror had used drugs or alcohol during
the trial absent a showing that the use had rendered the juror totally incompetent. Following
the lead of the Supreme Court in Tanner, it seems safe to conclude that even assuming the
"total incompetence" exception applies, the Fifth Circuit would probably apply it sparingly.
161. FED. R. EvrD. 611(a).
162. See FED. R. Evwo. 615.
163. 897 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. Mar. 1990).
164. Id. at 195.
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remanded for a hearing and the district court in turn allowed a
magistrate to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 65 On appeal of the
district court's denial of relief, the defendant argued that the magistrate's hearing was "artificially conducted and predetermined" and
that the magistrate abused his discretion in not excluding a prosecutor
from the courtroom. 166
On the first issue, the court rejected the argument that the
hearing was biased because the trial court continually interrupted the
questioning of witnesses and thus changed the direction of the hearing
and prevented a "clear presentation of the facts."' 6 7 The defendant,
according to the court, was given ample opportunity to present his
case. 16 The court stated:
The trier of fact in a federal forum is not confined to a silent or
passive role. It is common practice for a judge or magistrate to
ask questions of a witness for clarification. As the government
points out in its brief, this Court has expressly stated that the
trial judge "may comment on the evidence, may question witnesses
and elicit facts not yet adduced or clarify those previously presented." 69
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court
improperly permitted an assistant United States Attorney to remain
in the courtroom after the invocation of Federal Rule of Evidence
615, which requires the judge to exclude witnesses from the courtroom. 70 The rule contains exceptions, and in Samples it appeared
that the trial court had permitted the prosecutor to remain in the
courtroom under the second exemption in Rule 615 which applies to
"an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person
designated as its representative by its attorney . . . . ,,'7' The court
concluded that exempting the prosecutor was within the discretion
of the magistrate.
C.

Impeachment of Witness with a Prior Conviction

Perhaps one of the most devastating and controversial methods
of impeaching a witness is through the introduction of evidence that

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 197.
Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Moore v. United States, 598 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Id. at 197; see FED. R. Evm. 615.
897 F.2d at 197; FED. R. Evm. 615.
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the witness has a prior conviction. 72 The common theory underlying
this form of impeachment is that 'the evidence is relevant to credibility; persons who have been convicted are generally evil and prone
to lie. 73 The debate has swirled around the question of whether that
assumption applies to all convictions or only selected crimes. Federal
Rule of Evidence 609 indicates that only convictions for felonies or
74
for crimes involving dishonesty or false statements are admissible.
7
In Coursey v. Broadhurst, 1 the court addressed a number of
issues centered on the application of rule 609. The case arose from
176
a traffic accident in which the plaintiff, Coursey, was injured.
Before trial, Coursey filed a motion in limine to bar the defendant
from raising the fact that he had a prior felony theft conviction for
stealing cattle.' 77 The judge denied the motion and during opening
argument the defendant's counsel pointed out that the evidence would
show that Coursey was a convicted felon. 17 After the trial court
denied the plaintiff's motion for a mistrial, Coursey took the stand
and on direct examination related the fact that he indeed had a prior
conviction. 79
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial judge erred in: (1)
not excluding the prior conviction, and (2) not granting a mistrial
when defense counsel mentioned the conviction in his opening statement."* The court agreed with the plaintiff on the first issue that
the theft conviction was not one involving dishonesty or false statement under rule 609(a)(2).18' However, the court did conclude that

172. The legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 609 ("Impeachment by Conviction")
demonstrates the intense debate that focused on just how much use could be made of a
witness' prior conviction. See generally 1 S. SATZ1uuG & M. MATm, FEDERAL RUtES OF
EvwmDcE MANuAL 634 (5th ed. 1990). Under the common law, persons who had been convicted
were not competent to testify, a rule recognized in Texas and other states, and finally declared
unconstitutional in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (declaring as unconstitutional a
statute which barred the testimony of persons charged or tried as coaccuseds).
173. See, e.g., Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
174. See FED. R. Evto. 609(a).
175. 888 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. Nov. 1989).
176. Id. at 340.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 340-41.
179. Id. at 341.
180. Id. at 340.
181. Id. at 342. The defendant had argued that the conviction was not a crime involving
dishonesty or false statement and thus it was not automatically admissible. Id. at 341; see
FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(2).
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it was a felony conviction within the meaning of rule 609(a)(1), which
includes a requirement that the trial court balance the probative value
of a conviction against its potential prejudicial effect.8 2 Citing the
recent Supreme Court decision in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co.,183 the court concluded that the balancing test in rule 609(1), as
it existed at the time of the trial,' 8 was only available in criminal
cases; thus, the conviction in Coursey was automatically admissible
against the plaintiff. 85 The trial court, therefore, did not err in
admitting the conviction.
The question remained, however, whether it was reversible error
for the court to allow the defense counsel to "jump the gun" and
introduce evidence of the conviction during his opening statement.s6
Rule 609, as written at the time of the trial, indicated that proof of
the conviction would be admissible if elicited from the witness or if
raised during cross-examination. 187 Although the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the plaintiff that it was improper for defense counsel prematurely
to raise the issue of the conviction, the court noted that the plaintiff
admitted the fact in his direct testimony and held the error to be
harmless. s 8

182. See FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(1).
183.
- U.S.
-,
109 S. Ct. 1981, 104 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989) (noting the ambiguity in
the term "defendant" in rule 609(a)(1) and concluding that the balancing test in the provision
was only applicable in criminal trials).
184. A pending amendment to rule 609(a), effective December 1, 1990, apparently removes
the ambiguity and provides:
(a) General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be
admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
185. Coursey v. Broadhurst, 888 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir. Nov. 1989). The Fifth Circuit
noted that Green had overruled Fifth Circuit precedent which applied the balancing test in
both civil and criminal cases. Id. at 342 n.4.
186. See id. at 342-43.
187. See id. at 343. An amendment to rule 609 removes any reference to eliciting the
conviction during cross-examination. See supra note 184.
188. 888 F.2d at 343. The court noted that, because the plaintiff was the first witness for
his side, it would have been only a matter of hours after opening statements before defense
counsel would have raised the matter on cross-examination of the plaintiff. Id. at 343 n.5.
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OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of lay and expert opinion testimony. Although the common
law expressed a preference for facts rather than opinions,8I 9 the
Federal Rules of Evidence have generally relaxed that preference and
have smoothed the path for admission of both lay opinion testimony,
which is based upon the rational perceptions of a witness,'19 and
expert opinion testimony, when the witness, who is indeed an "expert,"' 9' has a basis for his or her opinion. 19 The fact that the
opinion may embrace an ultimate issue is not in itself grounds to
exclude the offered testimony.' 93 During the survey period, the court
had a number of opportunities to address the applicability of these
rules and in so doing may have signaled a trend toward a closer
scrutiny of expert opinion testimony. Before turning to those specific
cases, however, it is instructive to first consider the standard of
review that the court will apply in reviewing questions about the
admissibility of expert testimony.
A.

Expert Testimony: The "Manifestly Erroneous" Standard of
Review

In reviewing the question of whether a trial court erred in
admitting or excluding expert testimony, the court has made it very
clear that it will grant broad deference to trial judges and will reverse
only if the ruling is "manifestly erroneous."' 94 For example, in
Smogor v. Enke,'95 the court addressed the question of whether the
trial court erred in excluding expert medical testimony on the ultimate
issues of "negligence, proximate causation, and gross negligence"' 196
in a medical malpractice action. 97 At trial, counsel had apparently

189. See generally McCoRMBcK oN EVIDENCE § 11, at 26-29 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)
(discussing evolution of the opinion rules).
190. See FED. R. Evm. 701.
191. See FED. R. Evm. 702.
192. See FED. R. Evm. 703.
193. See FED. R. EvnD. 704.
194. See, e.g., Perkins v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 596 F.2d 681, 682 (5th Cir. 1979)
(upholding the admission of expert testimony based on a witness's general knowledge even
though the witness had no specific knowledge of the facts relevant to the dispute).
195. 874 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. June 1989).
196. Id. at 296.
197. Id. The plaintiffs had brought an action against their family physician and cardiologist
after the patient died. Id.
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attempted to avoid the objection that the testimony was a legal
conclusion'"8 by providing the expert with a precise legal definition
of the terms and then asking the expert to relate the facts in the
case to the legal concepts. 199 The trial court nonetheless excluded the
testimony."
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the testimony should have
been admissible under Texas precedent, which it claimed was applicable to the case. 20' Without directly addressing the plaintiff's argument for admitting the offered expert testimony, the court said:
The plaintiff's legal argument, as to the admissibility of the
expert's opinion, whatever merit it may have, does not overcome
our standard of review of the district court's evidentiary ruling.
Simply because it would not be error to admit certain expert
testimony does not mean it is error to exclude that testimony....
"The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is a matter left
to the discretion of the trial judge, and his or her decision will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous.''2
The court ultimately held that the trial court's exclusion of the
expert's testimony was not reversible error because the plaintiff had
not shown why the trial court's ruling was "manifestly erroneous.""2 3
B.

A Change in the Approach to Expert Testimony?

There has been a perceptible trend toward emphasizing the
importance of presenting expert opinion testimony, especially in
complicated cases involving novel medical or scientific issues. It is
not unusual to see, in both state and federal courts, a "battle of
experts" over a wide variety of issues. For the most part, appellate
courts are deferential to trial court decisions regarding whether to
admit expert testimony. But in two recent cases, the Fifth Circuit

198. Id.; see Owen v. Kerr McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983).
199. 874 F.2d at 296.
200. Id.
201. Id. Plaintiffs relied upon Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361
(Tex. 1987) (permitting testimony on mixed issues of law and facts regarding negligence). See
generally H. WEmwoRF & D. SCHLUETER, TExAs RULES OF EVDMENCE MANUAL 285 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing the issue). Cf. Louder v. DeLeon, 754 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex. 1988) (testimony
on mixed issues of law and fact still subject to rule 702).
202. 874 F.2d at 297 (emphasis in original) (quoting Perkins v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc.
596 F.2d 681, 682 (5th Cir. 1979).
203. Id.
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cautioned that the so-called "battle of the experts" is not ungovernable.
In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,2 parents of a
deformed child brought a suit against a drug manufacturer alleging
that a prescription drug, Bendectin, given to one of the plaintiffs
during her pregnancy caused the birth defects. 205 The jury found for
the plaintiffs and the defendant unsuccessfully moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. 20 In deciding the defendant's appeal
from the adverse ruling, the court considered the sufficiency of the
evidence presented by the plaintiffs, particularly the expert testimony
on the issue of whether it was reasonable to infer that the drug in
question had caused the birth defects. 20 Noting the complexity of
the scientific issues raised and the traditional approach of courts to
defer to the reasoning of medical experts, the court called for a
change.2m Now, said the court, judges must be prepared "critically
[to] evaluate the reasoning process by which the experts connect data
to their conclusions in order for courts to consistently and rationally
resolve the disputes before them.'' 2 9
Recognizing a parallel with the "Agent Orange" litigation, 210 the
Fifth Circuit stated that the courts in that litigation had "attacked
the reasoning of the experts and found it to be inadequate. ' 21 The
court also noted that the District of Columbia Circuit had taken the
same approach in a Bendectin case styled Richardson ex rel Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,212 where the court said: "[E]xpert
witnesses are indispensable in a case such as this. But that is not to
say that the court's hands are inexorably tied, or that it must accept

204. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. June 1989), cert. denied, - U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 1511,
108 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1990).
205. Id.at 308.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 311-13.
208. See id. at 309-10.
209. Id. at 310.
210. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
211. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. June 1989),
cert. denied, -U.S.
-,
110 S. Ct. 1511, 108 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1990); see 611 F. Supp.
at 1237-38.
212. 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S.
-,
110 S. Ct. 218, 107 L.
Ed. 2d 171 (1989).
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uncritically any sort of opinion espoused by an expert merely because
his credentials render him qualified to testify.' '213
Applying the approach employed by the District of Columbia
Citcuit to the facts in the Richardson case, the court ultimately
decided that there was a "lack of conclusive epidemiological proof"
which was fatal to the plaintiff's case. 214 The court concluded:
We expect that our decision here will have a precedential effect
on other cases pending in this circuit which allege Bendectin as
the cause of birth defects. Hopefully, our decision will have the
effect of encouraging district judges faced with medical and epidemiologic proof in subsequent toxic tort cases to be especially
vigilant in scrutinizing the basis, reasoning, and conclusiveness of
215
studies presented by both sides.
A similar note of caution was expressed by the court in Randolph
v. Laeisz, 216 where the plaintiff offered the testimony of an economist
in an attempt to show lost income.2 17 The court evaluated the
testimony and concluded that the expert's opinion was not supported
by a factual basis.218 In a terse comment, the court stated: "In
summary, we here echo the message given to our able trial colleagues
in In re Air Crash Disaster, 'it is time to take hold of expert testimony
in federal trials.' ",219
Although the two opinions probably do not signal a hostility to
expert testimony, they perhaps do serve as a reminder that the bench
and the bar should not take expert testimony at face value. The
temptation to do so is especially prevalent in complex scientific cases
where the natural tendency would be to depend on the training and
expertise of those whose job it is to sort through often conflicting
information and data. What the cases indicate is that trial courts
must carefully monitor the offered expert testimony and determine
if indeed it has some basis.
C. The Purpose of Expert Opinion: Assist the Trier of Fact
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits an "expert'"'2 to offer
opinion testimony if it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 829.
874 F.2d at 313.
Id. at 315.
896 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. Mar. 1990).
Id. at 967.
See id. at 967-68.
Id. at 968 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986)).
A witness can be considered an expert for the purposes of rules 702 and 703 on the
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evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 22 In two cases, the Fifth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether offered opinion testimony
would have assisted the trier of fact and in both instances sustained
the trial court's decision to exclude the testimony.
In Peters v. Five Star Marine Service,m2 the plaintiff was injured
in an offshore drilling platform accident when he slipped on the deck
during rough seas. 223 At trial, the plaintiff offered the testimony of
a maritime operations expert on the issue of whether the company
had acted properly in maintaining the work area considering the
adverse weather conditions. 22 After listening to the expert's qualifications and counsel's indications of the purpose of the testimony,
the trial judge ruled that the testimony was not admissible. 225 The
judge explained his ruling to the jury and informed them that the
226
testimony was not disallowed because the witness was not an expert.
Instead, the trial judge stated that the subject matter of the offered
testimony was within their "common sense" and their "knowledge
of the world." 227
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that the trial judge had
analyzed the appropriateness of the offered expert testimony in the
manner prescribed in the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule
of Evidence 702.228 The Fifth Circuit determined that, in Peters, the
jury was being asked by the plaintiff to consider whether it was
reasonable for the employer to require him to "manually move
equipment on the deck of a boat during heavy seas." 229 The jury
was also being asked to assess the likelihood that the equipment had
been improperly stowed and that spilled diesel fuel had made the
deck slippery. 230 These were issues where the "jury could adeptly
assess [the] situation using only their common experience and knowl-

basis of "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory
committee's note.
221. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
222.

898 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. Apr. 1990).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 448-49.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

229.

Id. at 450.

230.

Id.
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edge.'" Therefore, the expert testimony was "unnecessary" and the
decision of the trial court to exclude the testimony was within the
2 32
judge's discretion.
The court reached a similar result in Melton v. Deere & Co. ,233
where the plaintiff brought a products liability claim against the
manufacturer of a farm combine.2 At trial, the plaintiff offered the
expert testimony of a mechanical engineer, who was experienced with

combines and other agricultural equipment, on the issue of whether5
23
the combine in question was defective or unreasonably dangerous.
Noting that, because expert testimony may be admissible does not
necessarily mean that it is error to exclude it,236 the panel indicated
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not admitting the
testimony. 237 The only import of the testimony would have referred
to a theory of negligence-which was not in issue-or to a theory
of strict liability which the court had earlier rejected. 23 In both Peters
and Melton, the court considered not just whether the offered evidence was relevant, but more importantly, whether the offered evidence was helpful to the jury.
D.

Cumulative Expert Testimony

Otherwise admissible expert testimony may be excluded for a
number of reasons. For example, the testimony may be cumulative,
as in Leefe v. Air Logistics, Inc. ,239 In Leefe, the plaintiff had been
injured when a helicopter rolled over him as he was getting out of
it. 24 In establishing the extent and nature of his injuries, the plaintiff
first offered the testimony of his physician who related the injuries,

231. Id.
232. Id.; cf. Smith v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 857 F.2d 1471 (5th Cir. 1988) (unpublished
opinion) (holding that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a maritime operations
expert where the issues involved technical aspects of a crane's operation aboard ship in heavy
seas).
233. 887 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. Oct. 1989).
234. Id. at 1242.
235. Id. at 1244-45.
236. Id. at 1245 (citing Smogor v. Enke, 874 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. June 1989)). Cumulative
expert testimony is discussed in the next section. See infra notes 239-44 and accompanying
text.
237. 887 F.2d at 1245.

238. Id.
239. 876 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. June 1989).
240. Id.at 410.
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the nature of the medical care and the prognosis for recovery.YA
When the plaintiff offered the expert testimony of a second physician
whom he had also consulted and who would testify as to a specific
disability rating, the trial court concluded that the offered testimony
should be excluded because it was cumulative. 22
The Fifth Circuit carefully compared the testimony of the physician who had testified and the proffered testimony of the second
physician and determined that the latter's testimony would have been
cumulative.u 3 The court continued:
It is difficult for this court to determine the necessity and cumulative effect of testimony by several experts. For this reason,
we defer to the district court who is in the best position to make
these judgments. We do want to discourage attorneys from parading additional experts before the court in the hope that the
added testimony will improve on some element of the testimony
by the principal expert. With this caveat, nothing in this opinion
should be read to impose a precise limit on the number of experts
who can testify in a given area.2
It is hard to imagine that the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Leefe, which
is entirely consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 403, would have
an appreciable impact on the number of experts lined up to testify.
But it does serve as a reminder that counsel should prioritize expert
testimony in the event the district court concludes that some, but
not all, experts will be permitted to testify. If more than one expert
is needed on a particular issue or point, counsel should be prepared
to articulate specifically why an additional expert is necessary and
why the same questions could not have been put to the first expert.
VI.

HEARSAY

The rules governing the admissibility of hearsay are spelled out
in Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. According to rule
801(c), "hearsay" is defined as a statement, other than one made by
the declarant in court, which is offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted245 Thus, by definition, if the words either verbally

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 411.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See FatD. R. Evm. 801(c).
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or in writing, do not constitute a "statement" or if they are offered

into evidence to prove something other than the truth of the matter,
they are not hearsay. Rule 801 also lists various out-of-court state-

ments which otherwise satisfy the definition but because of various
policy reasons, they are considered as "nonhearsay"

or exemptions

from the hearsay rule. 6 Even assuming that the offered evidence
constitutes hearsay, it may be admissible under one of the myriad
hearsay exceptions which are codified in Federal Rules of Evidence
803247 and 804.2 In a series of cases during the survey period, the

court addressed the issues of what constitutes a "statement,

'24 9

whether a statement is being offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted, 250 the admissibility of an accomplice's statement against
penal interest, 25' the business records exception 25 2 and finally, im25 3
peachment of a hearsay declarant.
A.

Hearsay: Questions Are Not Statements

Rule 801's definition of hearsay focuses on the admissibility of
"statements." In United States v. Lewis,25 4 the Fifth Circuit addressed
the issue of whether questions could constitute statements for the
purposes of the hearsay rule. When the two defendants were arrested
on charges relating to cocaine possession, each of them had an
electronic beeper or pager in his possession. When the beeper associated with defendant Lewis began beeping, an officer called the
telephone number appearing on the pager and the party at the other
end said, "Did you get the stuff?" 2 5 The officer answered in the

246. See, e.g., FED. R. Evi. 801(d)(l)(A) (prior inconsistent statement made under oath
at prior proceeding).
247. See FED. R. Evm. 803 (hearsay exceptions where availability of declarant is immaterial).
248. See FED. R. Evim. 804 (hearsay exceptions where declarant is unavailable).
249. See United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. May 1990).
250. See United States v. Vizcarra-Porras, 889 F.2d 1435, 1439 (5th Cir. Nov. 1989), cert.
denied, - U.S.
-,
110 S. Ct. 2192, 109 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1990); United States v. Abadie,
879 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. July 1989), cert. denied, - U.S.
-,
110 S. Ct. 569, 107
L. Ed. 2d 563 (1989); United States v. Cantu, 876 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. June 1989).
251. See United States v. Vernor, 902 F.2d 1182, 1186-88 (5th Cir. May 1990), cert. denied,
-U.S.
-,.. 111 S. Ct. 301, 112 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1990).
252. See United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (5th Cir. June 1989).
253. See United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321, 326-29 (5th Cir. May 1990).
254. 902 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. May 1990).
255. Id. at 1179.
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affirmative and in response to the next question, "Where is Dog,"
the officer said that he was not available; the officers later learned
25 6
that "Dog" was the nickname for Lewis' codefendant, Wade.
The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the questions
asked by the person answering the telephone were "statements"
within the definition of hearsay. 2 7 Rule 801(a) indicates that a
statement is an "oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct
intended as an assertion." 25 The court continued by noting:
The effect of this definition is to remove from the operation of
the hearsay rule "all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal,
not intended as an assertion." . . . While "assertion" is not
defined in the rule, the term has the connotation of a positive
declaration .... The questions asked by the unknown caller, like
most questions and inquiries, are not hearsay because
they do
25 9
not, and were not intended to, assert anything.
The court likewise rejected the defendants' arguments that the ques2
tions were "implied assertions" which amounted to statements. W
Again applying the definition of hearsay in rule 801,261 the court
262
concluded that implied assertions were not within the definition.
Interestingly, the case would have been decided differently in a Texas
state court given the fact that the Texas version of rule 801 deliberately includes implied assertions and also defines "statement" in
terms of an "expression." 263
B.

Statements Not Offered to Prove Truth of Matter Asserted

According to the definition of hearsay, only out-of-court statements that are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted are

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. (emphasis in original); see FED. R. Evum. 801(a).
259. 902 F.2d at 1179 (citations omitted). Theoretically, a question might be considered an
assertion if it was intended to answer another question. For example, in response to the
question, "Is it cold outside?" the declarant says, "Do bears live in the woods?" Arguably,
this would be an assertion falling within the definition of hearsay.
260. Id. The defendants had argued that the question implicitly indicated that the defendants
were expecting to receive some "stuff." Id.
261. See FED. R. Evm. 801(a).
262. 902 F.2d at 1179 (citing United States v. Groce, 682 F.2d 1359, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980)).
263. See TEx. R. Cram. Evm. 801. See generally H. WENirDoR & D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS
RULES or EVIDENCE MA
301-03 (2d Ed. 1988) (explaining Texas' definition of the word
"statement").
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considered hearsay.3 Thus, if the proponent can show that the
relevance of the statement rests on something other than showing
the truth of what was stated, it is not hearsay. One of the most
common examples of a nonhearsay use is to show that the statements
were relied upon in taking subsequent action. For example, in United
States v. Vizcarra-Porras,As the prosecution offered, over the objections of the defense counsel, statements by an informant to a law
2
enforcement officer concerning the defendant's desire to sell heroin. "
The court concluded that the objections were properly overruled
because the out-of-court statements were offered to show why the
government initiated an investigation of the defendant and attempted
to set up a drug buy.267
A similar result was reached in United States v. Abadie,2" where
a police officer was permitted to testify about statements made to
him by a confidential informant concerning the drug activity of one
of the defendants. 2" The statements were admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that the police had probable cause to
arrest one of the defendants." 0
Finally, in United States v. Cantu,2 71 the defendant, who was
charged with various drug offenses, claimed that he had been entrapped by a man named Santander, who was working for the Drug
Enforcement Administration.272 Before trial, however, the government
filed a motion in limine asking that the defense not be permitted to
offer any evidence of statements made by Santander to the defendant.273 The court granted the motion over the defendant's objection . 4 In making its ruling, the trial court noted that the statements

264. See FED. R. Evm. 801(a).
265. 889 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. Nov. 1989), cert. denied,

-_ U.S.

,

110 S.Ct. 2192,

109 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1990).

266.

Id.at 1439.

267. Id.
268. 879 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. July 1989), cert. denied,
107 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1989).

-

U.S.

,

110 S. Ct. 569,

269. Id. at 1264.
270. Id. Other statements made by the informant should have been excluded because they
were apparently offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted-the details of a drug
transaction. Id. The court concluded, however, that the error was either waived or constituted
harmless error. Id.
271. 876 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. June 1989).
272. Id. at 1136.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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were "really important"2 75 to the defendant to show his state of
mind and whether he was really being harassed by the informant to
take part in the drug transactions. 27 6 But the trial court expressed
concern that there was no way to test the trustworthiness of state277
ments made to the defendant by the absent informant.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction. 278 Noting that the
defendant had offered Santander's statements to show government
inducement to commit a crime, the court stated:
As we understand the proffer and [the defendant's] explanation,
he sought to testify about Santander's persistence and his efforts
to resist Santander's blandishments. The statements Santander
allegedly made were not offered to prove that Santander really
wanted [the defendant] to get drug customers but, rather, to prove
that he made the statements. The statements were not offered as
an assertion of a fact but, rather, as the fact of an assertion. As
2 79
such the statements were not hearsay.
The Fifth Circuit also stated that the trial court's concern about the
ability to test the trustworthiness of the statements was misplaced.M°
The defendant, in testifying about what Santander told him, would
have been subject to the "crucible of cross-examination" and the
jury could have decided, with regard to the statements, whether to
believe him.28 ' The trial court's ruling, according to the court, deprived the defendant of a "critical element" in his entrapment

defense .282
The holding seems entirely consistent with the first two cases,
Vizcarra-Porrasand Abadie. As the trial court noted, however, it is
difficult to assess the trustworthiness of statements made by an absent
declarant. Nevertheless, that is true for most out-of-court statements,
and where the "truth" of the assertion is not the reason the statement
is being offered, the need for confronting the declarant is apparently
not as crucial. In that instance, the opponent will be left with crossexamining the in-court witness concerning the details of the alleged

out-of-court statement.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

1136-37.
1137.
1138.
1137.
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C.

Statements Against Interest Made by an Accomplice

Out of court statements offered against an accused in a criminal
case implicate the sixth amendment right of confrontation. That is,
the defendant's right to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant may
be limited or even nonexistent. The fact that the statements may be
admissible under one of the many hearsay exceptions does not
necessarily void the constitutional argument. In addressing the applicability of the right of confrontation to a particular hearsay
exception, the Supreme Court has stated:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing
that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only
if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must
be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees

of trustworthiness .83
Using this paradigm, the Fifth Circuit recently addressed the question
of whether the admission of an accomplice's out-of-court statements,
implicating both the defendant and himself, violated the defendant's
right of confrontation. In United States v. Vernor,2 the defendant
was tried on charges arising from efforts to assist his father in what
the court called a "clumsy and botched" robbery. 285 In an interview
with the police, the defendant's father confessed to the crime and
implicated his son, the defendant, as well 286 The prosecution called
the father to the stand and when he invoked his right to remain
silentw the prosecution offered his pretrial statements over the objections of the defendant. 28 The trial court ruled that the father's
statements were admissible as statements against interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). 289
Noting that the Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on the
issue of whether a statement against penal interest is a "firmly

283.
284.
112 L.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
902 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. May 1990), cert. denied,
Ed. 2d 254 (1990).
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1185.
Id.
Id.; see Fsm. R. Evw. 804(b)(3).

-

U.S.

-

, 111 S. Ct. 301,
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rooted" exception to the hearsay rule, 9 and that the Court has also
held consistently that an accomplice's confession that incriminates
another defendant is "presumptively unreliable,''291 the Fifth Circuit
indicated that it would "decide this case as involving a confession
by an accomplice that incriminates a criminal defendant. ' ' 29 The
test, said the court, was whether there were sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness to overcome the presumption of unreliability. 29
The court observed that accomplice confessions are suspect because statements implicating another person may be an attempt to
"shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another.''294 After carefully examining the circumstances
involved in making the statement, the court concluded that the
dangers were not present in the case; the father had taken full blame
for the robbery.2 Furthermore, there was independent corroboration
of the statements. 29
Although the case presents an excellent analysis of the interplay
between the confrontation clause and hearsay when applied to accomplice statements, it seems to present a unique situation; the
codefendants were father and son, and apparently the fact that the
father did not attempt to shift the blame to his own son was a
crucial consideration.

290. 902 F.2d at 1186 (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544, n.5 (1986)). Cf. United
States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984)

(recognizing that a declaration against interest is a firmly rooted hearsay exception).
291. United States v. Vernor, 902 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (5th Cir. May 1990), cert. denied,
-U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 301, 112 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1990) (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530, 541 (1986)).
292. Id. at 1187 (quoting 476 U.S. at 544 n.5).
293. Id. In a footnote, the court observed that in order to determine whether a statement
against interest is admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) and the confrontation clause, a three-part
test should be applied:
(1) The declarant must be unavailable;
(2) The statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability that
a reasonable person in his position would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true; and
(3) The statement must be corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its
trustworthiness.
Id. at 1187 n. 3 (quoting United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. Unit A
Jan. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982)).
294.

Id. at 1187 (quoting 476 U.S. at 545).

295.
296.

Id.at 1188.
Id.
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D.

The Business Records Exception

One of the most common exceptions to the hearsay rule is the
97
business records exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).2
During the survey period, the court had an opportunity to address
the application of that exception in both the civil and criminal
contexts.
In the first case, Wilander v. McDermott International, Inc.,298
the plaintiff was injured while working on an off-shore platform in
the Middle East.2 In an attempt to preserve evidence of the accident,
the barge captain, on his own initiative, took the written statements
of the Indian crewmen who witnessed the accident 3 ' ° Over the
plaintiff's objection, the trial court admitted the statements as business records. 30° Applying the foundation requirements for the business
records exception, 302 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the written
statements did not fall within the exception.3 3 There had been no
showing that the statement was kept in the regular course of business
or that it was within the regular course of the business to make such
records. 3 4 The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the
statement was admissible under the "last resort" exception to the
30 5
hearsay rule.
The business records exception was again addressed in United
States v. Bentley. 34 After a plane crash in which the defendant was
a passenger, he was taken to Lubbock General Hospital where a
urine sample was taken.3 07 The medical records of the test which
showed the presence of marijuana were later introduced at his trial
on various drug charges."s

297. See FED. R. EviD. 803(6).
298. 887 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. Oct. 1989), aff'd, - U.S. -,
111 S. Ct. 807, 112 L. Ed.
2d 866 (1991).
299. Id. at 89.
300. Id. at 91.
301. Id.
302. See FED. R. EviD. 803(6).
303. 887 F.2d at 92.
304. Id.
305. Id.; see FED. R. Evu). 803(24). The court indicated that two factors made the statement
untrustworthy. First, it was apparently made in contemplation of litigation; second, the witness
later contradicted the statement. 887 F.2d at 92.
306. 875 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. June 1989).
307. Id. at 1116.
308. Id.
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On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in
treating the medical records as a business record. 309 He reasoned that,
because the medical records of a public agency would not be admissible under the public records and reports exception in rule 803(8),310
the prosecution could not come through the back door by relying
upon rule 803(6).311 Although the court recognized that the argument
had prevailed in United States v. Oates,3 12 the Fifth Circuit at first
314
approved Oates,3 3 then apparently later disapproved its reasoning.
But the court dodged the issue by deciding first that, even assuming
it was error to admit the documents under rule 803(6), the error was
35
harmless.
It is unfortunate, but understandable, that the court did not
decide the issue. The interplay between rules 803(8) and 803(6) poses
difficult problems of application and some guidance from the court
would have been welcomed. For now, counsel and judges within the
Fifth Circuit are left to reconcile the apparent conflict between the
two Fifth Circuit cases addressing the issue.
E.

Impeaching the Hearsay Declarant

Assuming that the trial court decides to admit hearsay evidence,
either written or oral, Federal Rule of Evidence 806 permits the
parties to treat the declarant as any other witness, for purposes of
impeachment and rehabilitation. 3 6 The rule states, in pertinent part:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule
801(d)(2),(C),(D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may
be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for
those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness .... 117
Remarkably, there is relatively little case law on the rule, which may
explain why rule 806 was not cited by either side at the trial level in

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 1117.
Id.; see FED. R. Evm. 803(8).
875 F.2d at 1117.
560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
See United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980) (adopting Oates).
See United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir. 1985) (disapproving

Oates).
315. United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. June 1989).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1988) (permitting
testimony about prior conviction to impeach a hearsay declarant).
317. See FED. R. Ev. 806.
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United States v. Moody.31 8 In Moody, the defendant was charged
with seventeen counts of fraud arising out of the misuse of funds in
the Moody Foundation.1 9 At trial, the prosecution introduced the
statements of the defendant's coconspirators under rule 801(d)(2)(E) a20
which implicated the defendant. 21 When the defendant attempted to
impeach his absent coconspirators with opinion testimony on their
character for truthfulness, 3 22 the trial judge sustained the government's objection.3 23 The gist of the objection was that the defendant
324
could only impeach witnesses who had testified at trial.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendant. Citing rule 806 as
directly on point, the court noted:
The government, to our dismay, fails even to acknowledge the
applicability of Rule 806 in this case: It does not cite the rule in
its brief and, upon inquiry at oral argument, suggested passingly
that [the coconspirators's] poor reputations were established by
other substantive evidence at trial and that the rule was never
violated. We conclude that Rule 806 cannot be dispensed with so
3
easily. 2
The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that the trial court's error in
not permitting the defense to impeach the hearsay declarants denied
the defendant the sixth amendment right to confrontation and was
3
reversible Constitutional error. 2
The Moody decision is truly remarkable for several reasons.
First, it is one of the few cases involving a reversal on an evidentiary
point. Second, it is one of the very few cases addressing the applicability of rule 806. Third, the decision is really not even a close
call, as is often true in other evidence cases. Finally, it serves as a
reminder that in some cases there is no substitute for studying and
applying the applicable rule in question. It is not hard to imagine
that if both counsel and the court had the rule in front of them, the
Fifth Circuit would have been denied the opportunity to address the

rule at all .327
318.
319.

903 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. May 1990).
Id. at 323.
320. Id. at 327. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(E).
321. At the time of trial, the defendant's confederates were fugitives. 903 F.2d at 327.
322. See FED. R. Evm. 608(a).
323. 903 F.2d at 327-28.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 329.
326. Id.
327. The transcript indicates that apparently neither counsel nor the judge consulted the
rule itself. Id. at 328.
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CONCLUSION

Several lessons seem to emerge from the evidence cases decided
by the Fifth Circuit during the survey period. First, the court continues to follow the path of deference to the trial judge on evidentiary
rulings. Although several of the cases resulted in reversible error, in
those instances, the evidence involved key elements of a party's
case. 32 Second, rule 404(b) continues to be a popular rule in criminal
cases and both the prosecution and defense should be prepared to
identify with particularity why extrinsic act evidence is or is not
admissible under the rule. Third, the cases serve as a reminder of
the utility of rule 403; it was one of the most frequently cited rules.
Fourth, the cases on expert opinion testimony may signal a closer
scrutiny by trial judges of expert opinions, especially in complicated
cases involving novel scientific theories or principles. Finally, the
court's decision in United States v. Moody serves as an excellent
reminder that there is generally no substitute for consulting the
applicable rule of evidence.

328.

See FED. R. Evm. 103.

